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I. AN "ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN"
There is no such thing as a natural disaster.1 Environmental events
have negative human consequences only to the extent that social
conditions and practices put human beings in harm's way. 2
Conversely, proper preparation can minimize the otherwise
catastrophic consequences of natural events. 3
An ounce of
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1. THERE IS

No

SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND

(Gregory Squires & Chester Hartman eds., 2006); see also
Jim Chen, Law Among the Ruins, in 2 LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER:
HURRICANE KATRINA

HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009). See generally DISASTER
LAW AND POLICY 203-47 (Daniel A. Farber, Jim Chen, Robert R.M. Verchick &

Lisa Grow Sun eds., 2d ed. 2010).
2. Compare Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TULANE ENVTL.

L.J. 1, 28 (2006) ("Global warming and sea level rise are no more natural
calamities than Katrina and Rita were. They are natural consequences of human
actions, short term profits and to-hell-with-the-rest."), with Gilbert F. White,
Human Adjustment to Floods, in 1 GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF GILBERT F. WHITE 12 (Robert W. Kates & Ian Burton eds.,

1986) ("Floods are 'acts of God,' but flood losses are largely acts of man.").
3. See, e.g., Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence Liability Exposure in
Disaster Management, 23 URB. LAW. 333, 334 (1991) ("While it may seem

contradictory to 'plan' for an emergency - emergencies are by definition
unplanned events - ... there is considerable value in such planning."); Phil
O'Keefe, Ken Westgate & Ben Wismer, Taking the Naturalness Out of Natural
Disasters,260 NATURE 566 (1976).
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prevention is worth almost literally a pound of cure. By one
estimate, each dollar spent on disaster preparedness is worth roughly
$15 in mitigated future damage.4 Society nevertheless fails to take
due care to avoid or mitigate these losses.
Individuals and
governments alike systematically underestimate the risk and
magnitude of disasters and underinvest in otherwise cost-justified
precautionary measures. 5 Across the landscape of disaster, from
putatively "natural" events such as hurricanes to the full range of
losses such as rogue trading, fatal medical errors, and industrial
accidents at Three Mile Island and Bhopal, systematic
underinvestment in prevention, precaution,
and preparation gives rise
6
happen.",
to
waiting
to "accidents
So strong are these forces that the entire enterprise of risk
management devolves quickly from simple matters of risk avoidance
and conflict resolution into economically complex and legally
contested forms of risk transfer. Among the four basic tools of risk
management - avoidance, reduction, retention, and transfer - the
greatest amount of complexity lies in arranging the transfer of risk.7
Intractable legal complexities confound the transfer of risk, whether

O'Keefe, Ken Westgate & Ben Wismer, Taking the Naturalness Out of Natural
Disasters,260 NATURE 566 (1976).
4. See M. Ishaq Nadiri & Ingmar Prucha, Estimation of DepreciationRate of
Physical and R&D Capital in the U.S. Total Manufacturing Sector, 34 ECON.

INQUIRY 43 (1996) (estimating that physical capital deployed in American
manufacturing depreciates at the rate of 5.9% per year); cf Andrew Healy & Neil
Malhotra, Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy, 103 AM. POL. Sci. REV.

387, 396 (2009) (estimating "the total benefit of a dollar of preparedness spending"
as "all future reductions in damage," taking care to discount "those benefits ...
for
the fact that resources invested today in other ways could have yielded their own
return and that preparedness investments will depreciate, becoming less effective
over time"). Combining Nadiri and Prucha's 5.9% depreciation rate with their own
estimate of a 4% annual interest rate, Healy and Malhotra "estimate the NPV [net
present value] of $1 of disaster preparedness to be about $15." Id.
5. See Howard Kunreuther, MitigatingDisasterLosses Through Insurance, 12
J. RISK& UNCERTAINTY

171 (1996).

6. See Jean-Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra, On the Problem of Prevention, 54
INT'L ECON. REV. 787, 787 (2013).
7. See generally, e.g., MARK S. DORFMAN & DAVID CATHER, INTRODUCTION
TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (10th ed. 2012); INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 31000: RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION

(2009); Michael R.

Diversification,Hedging, and "Pacification," 11 J. RISK FIN. 441 (2010).

Powers,
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to government or to specialized institutions that profit by pooling
risks too treacherous or ruinous for others to bear.
In settings
characterized by extreme loss, incurred within compressed time
frames, governmental intervention is almost certain.
Laws regulating financial preparedness for catastrophes reveal the
actuarial suppositions underlying disaster law and policy. This
article explores three facets of risk transfer. Part II explores how risk
transfer emerges as the preeminent tool for managing risk. Measures
sufficient for managing more modest risks break down as the
probability of loss plummets but the magnitude of potential loss
increases.
The choice to transfer risk (as opposed to avoiding or managing it
through mitigation, diversification, or hedging) leaves open the
question of whether private insurance markets can handle
catastrophic, highly correlated risks. Part III explores one alternative
risk transfer mechanism by which insurance companies have sought
to deepen their financial reserves in anticipation of correlated risks.
Correlation among risks, the primary obstacle to functional insurance
markets for catastrophic coverage, emerges in new form as the
motivation for catastrophe bonds - and as these instruments'
leading pitfall.
Upon part III's conclusion that catastrophe bonds have not
perfected private insurers' financial preparedness for disaster (and
may never occupy more than a modest niche within the market for
risk transfer), part IV explores constraints on public intervention into
disaster insurance. Along the dimensions of space, time, and human
behavior, policies compensating individuals for disaster-related
losses elude justification on any coherent economic basis. The
political economy of public intervention in disaster finance virtually
guarantees catastrophic legal responses to catastrophic risks. 8
II. CORRELATION, COVERAGE, AND CATASTROPHE
Disaster law consists of "assembling the best portfolio of legal
rules to deal with catastrophic risks - a portfolio that includes
prevention, emergency response, compensation and insurance, and

J.

8. See Richard A. Epstein, CatastrophicResponses to CatastrophicRisks, 12
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287, 294 (1996).
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rebuilding strategies." 9 Certain components of this portfolio seek the
optimal balance between spreading risk ex ante and compensating
victims of disaster ex post. Financial preparedness for catastrophe
takes myriad forms, from case-by-case compensation through tort
law to hybrid systems of private and public insurance. 10 The diverse
aspects of disaster law addressing the traditional domain of insurance
and finance span a complete remedial spectrum, from compensation
through tort actions to alternative risk transfer and public
disaster
11
relief through ex ante insurance or ex post compensation.
Law typically frames the goal of reallocating and redistributing
wealth after disaster as that of compensating victims for their losses.
From an economic perspective, disaster law should prepare society to
avoid future losses by providing proper incentives to private parties
to take due care, by bolstering the resilience of vulnerable
communities, and by expanding social capacity to respond to
disaster.12 At its best, "disaster law should deploy its portfolio of
tools for compensation and risk-spreading in pursuit of two related
but distinct goals: risk management through avoidance of loss and
reduction of hazard, plus affirmative investments in human capital
and social preparedness. 13
Disaster law presumably begins with the option of taking no
action.14 Whatever losses arise from a particular event, the law could
offer no recourse, leaving individuals to absorb their losses or, at
best, to allocate them according to privately contracted arrangements.
Beyond this threadbare baseline, the law may compensate disaster
victims through the ordinary tort system. To the extent that victims
can identify individual and corporate defendants who have breached
some duty of care, tort law provides a case-by-case, pay-as-you-go
9. DISASTER LAW & POLICY, supra note 1, at xxi; accord Susan S. Kuo &
Benjamin Means, CorporateSocial Responsibility After Disaster,89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 973, 975 n.ll (2012).
10. See DISASTER LAW & POLICY, supra note 1, at 291.
11. See generally id. at 291-343.
12. See generally id. at 345-90.
13. Jim Chen, Modern DisasterTheory: EvaluatingDisasterLaw as a Portfolio
ofLegal Rules, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1121, 1132 (2011).

14. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2014) (authorizing a finding of no
significant impact under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4327 (2012), when major federal action "will not have a significant effect on
the human environment and for which an environmental impact statement therefore
will not be prepared").
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system of compensation. Certain statutory schemes tailor recovery
according to particular types of disaster. For example, under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, "each responsible party for a vessel or a
facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or
adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the
removal costs and damages ...
that result from such incident."15

Compensation through tort suits, by whatever specific legal
mechanism, leaves much to be desired economically. The tort
system's inefficiency, estimated to be as high as 50 percent,
undermines its effectiveness in deterring negligence, compensating
victims, and spreading risk. 16 From a strictly economic view of
efficiency, "catastrophic losses, almost by definition, would seem
poor candidates for deterrence through" a tort-based "liability
system."17
Local, state, and federal governments may also face lawsuits.
Despite the proliferation of statutes immunizing governments against
liability for negligent disaster management," individuals may, under
certain conditions, sue the public operators of large-scale public
infrastructure that fails during times of disaster.19 Governments may
face inverse condemnation liability under state law. 20 Within limits
imposed by the Federal Tort Claims Act,2 1 victims may also recover
damages from the United States. In litigation arising from Hurricane
15. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012); John C.P. Goldberg,
Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30
MIss. C.L. REV. 335, 384 (2011); David W. Robertson, The Oil Pollution Act's
Provisions on Damages for Economic Loss, 30 MIss. C.L. REV. 157, 161-62
(2011). See generally Symposium, Beyond the Horizon: The Gulf Oil Spill Crisis
- Analyzing the Economic, Environmental, and Legal Implications of the Oil Spill,
30 Miss. C. L. REV. 149 (2011).
16. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION
PAID IN TORT LITIGATION

70-71 (Rand Institute Civil Justice 1986).

17. George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of
CatastrophicLoss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 235 (1996) [hereinafter Priest,
The Problem of CatastrophicLoss]; See generally George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).

18. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 336-40.
19. See Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing a common law duty arising from a utility's adoption of flood control
measures).
20. See Paterno v. California, 113 Cal. App. 4th 998, 1003 (2003).

21. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
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Katrina, the Fifth Circuit has held that the federal government could
not claim immunity under the Flood Control Act against claims
related to the dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, but could
assert immunity against claims stemming from levee breaches caused
by the dredging of the canal. 22 It could also assert immunity against
other claims under the discretionary-function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act.23 Furthermore, the federal government may face
takings clause liability for government-induced flood control
measures that effect a permanent or even temporary occupation of
private property. 24 Despite their complexities, tort actions against
governments treat official defendants in their proprietary rather than
their regulatory capacities that is, as owners of property as
opposed to sovereigns capable of regulating private actors, collecting
taxes, and redistributing wealth. 25
Property owners, private or public, routinely self-insure against
risks. 26 If expected exposure to a risk is sufficiently small and
regular to be managed without resort to outside financial
intermediaries, a private party may manage risk by systematically
contributing to a sinking fund or maintaining a liquid reserve in
excess of its own assessment of probable exposure. 27
Not
surprisingly, self-insurance plays a modest, even negligible role in
22. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 444-52 (5th Cir.
2012).
23. Compare United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986) (holding that 33
U.S.C. §702c, which provides that no "liability of any kind shall attach to or rest
upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any
place," exempts the United States from liability for injuries resulting from flood
control projects conducted by the United States Corps of Engineers), with Central
Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425 (2001) (holding that immunity under §
702c depends upon "the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage
rather than the relation between that damage and a [federal] flood control project").
24. See Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522
(2012).
25. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 198 (1986).
26. See generally, e.g., Eric Briys & Harris Schlesinger, Risk Aversion and the
Propensitiesfor Self-Insurance and Self-Protection, 57 S. ECON. J. 458, 458-59
(1990); Georges Dionnes & Louis Eeckhardt, Self-Insurance, Self-Protection, and
Increased Risk Aversion, 17 ECON. LETTERS 39 (1985); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S.
Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON.
623, 623-24 (1972).
27. See ROBERT RIEGEL & JEROME S. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 26 (5th ed. 1996).
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disaster law. 28 Sudden, calamitous events warranting the label of
"disaster" routinely exceed the financial and managerial capacity of
individual property owners and even that of governments. 29
Indeed, it is not too far-fetched to assert that disaster law begins at
the precise point where risk may be expected to transcend the
managerial capacity of any individual party. The probability of loss,
multiplied by its magnitude, may simply exceed financial resources
at hand. In addition, multiple sources of risk may correlate with each
other, thus raising the amount that a party must raise or reserve in
order to be financially prepared. Wealth effects of all sorts are likely
to complicate social responses to risk. Despite their reputation as
"great social equalizers" that "strike unpredictably and at random,"
natural disasters inflict far disproportionate injury upon the socially
and economically vulnerable. 30 Finally, certain hazards may lurk
beyond the capacity of planners to project the true probability that
those hazards may come to pass, let alone the expected value of the
total exposure at stake. 31
In somewhat different language, we might say that tort law defines
due care as a straightforward exercise in cost-benefit analysis. The
celebrated case of United States v. Carroll Towing 32 defined
negligence and due care "in algebraic terms: if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
28. See DISASTER LAW & POLICY, supra note 1, at 342.
29. See id. at 291, 342.
30. See BEN WISNER, PIERS BLAIKIE, TERRY CANNON & IAN DAVIS, AT RISK:
NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE'S VULNERABILITY AND DISASTERS 11 (2d ed. 2003)

(defining "social vulnerability" during disaster as "the characteristics of a person or

group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from
the impact of a natural hazard").
31. See Herman B. Leonard & Arnold M. Howitt, Acting in Time Against
Disasters: A Comprehensive Risk-Management Framework, in LEARNING FROM
CATASTROPHES: STRATEGIES FOR REACTION AND RESPONSE 18, 25 (Howard
Kunreuther & Michael Useem eds., 2010) (observing that ex ante planning for
disaster, in contrast with ex post responses, must anticipate a range of hypothetical
scenarios and outcomes, and do so on the basis of incomplete information). For a
treatment of "parameter uncertainty" or the impossibility of calculating actuarially

sound premiums for unprecedented events in the context of terrorism insurance, see
J. David Cummins & Christopher M. Lewis, Catastrophic Events, Parameter
Uncertainty, and the Breakdown of Implicit Long-Term Contracting in the
Insurance Market: The Case of Terrorism Insurance, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY.
153 (2003).
32. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Insurance is a common and convenient arrangement for gathering the
financial resources needed to take due care. Disaster policy, at its
best, should identify the physical, fiscal, political, and
epistemological points of stress that are most likely to undermine
catastrophic preparedness.
In light of the foregoing considerations, private insurance
represents one of the first most important layers of financial
preparedness for disaster. Losses that are at once catastrophic in
magnitude and attributable to minute risks are best suited for insurers
with the wealth and financial integrity to pool risks too great for most
other actors to bear alone and to spread those risks across a broader
financial base.3 4
But many disasters pose special trouble even for the largest, most
financially secure insurers.35 Like their customers, insurance carriers
have trouble evaluating the true likelihood of actuarially remote
events.3 6 Leptokurtic "probability distributions," more commonly
known as fat-tailed distributions,
"are inherently difficult to
3
7
estimate.
When "events are rare," the sheer lag time between
iterations often makes it "impossible to estimate just how quickly the
tail tapers off."' 38 Because "fat tails bring with them an epistemic
problem,, 39 the law has failed to develop "a commonly accepted
economic framework for dealing with ... thick-tailed extreme
disasters., 40
In other words, the risks combining the lowest
probability with the highest potential losses defy prediction under
any statistical model. Their very rarity renders the most catastrophic

33. Id. at 173.
34. See ORGANISATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

ENVIRONMENT RISKS AND INSURANCE:

A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE

OF INSURANCE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENT-RELATED

RISKS

68-69

(2003).
35. See generally RAWLE 0. KING, HURRICANE KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES
AND NATIONAL
CAPACITIES
FOR FINANCING
DISASTER
RISKS
(2008)

(Congressional Research Service Report No. 33086).
36. See RIEGEL & MILLER, supra note 27, at 34-35.
37. Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of
Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 703, 723 (2007).
38. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 926 (2011).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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events virtually impossible to manage with any degree of ex ante
confidence or competence.
If a calamity is large enough, the sheer magnitude of the losses at
stake will exceed the capacity of any single financial actor.4 1 As a
rule, "private insurers do not offer policies to cover water damage for
hurricanes or actively promote earthquake coverage" because they
fear both "the uncertainty of the risk and ...
the severe financial cost

of a catastrophic disaster" for which the insurance industry had
extended "widespread coverage.", 42 Insurance against disasters is
bedeviled by the same factors that cripple private insurance in every
realm. In order to pool risks and pay claims profitably, insurers must
be able to predict losses with accuracy.43 The mere availability of
insurance invites moral hazard in the sense that insured parties have
an incentive at the margin, by virtue of the insurer's agreement to
pay, to engage in risky behavior. 44 Moreover, adverse selection all
but guarantees that an insurer must cover the worst risks within any
41. See id.
42. Kunreuther, MitigatingDisasterLosses Through Insurance,supra note 5, at
178; see also Howard Kunreuther, Neil Doherty & Anne Kleffner, Should Society
Deal with the Earthquake Problem?, REGULATION, Spring 1992, at 60, 65
("[R]einsurers show little interest in offering more protection against ...
earthquakes [and other natural hazards] because they believe that the premium they
feel they can justify will expose them to excessive risk.").
43. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Serv., Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th
249, 254 (1999); Nancy R. Page, Risky Business: Consumer Protection in the
Insurance Industry, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 291 (1986) ("When accurate
prediction is no longer possible, some liability markets become theoretically too
risky for insurance.").
44. See MARK A. DORFMAN & DAVID CATHER, INTRODUCTION TO RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 (10th ed. 2012); Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996); Christopher C.
French, Construction Defects: Are They "Occurrences"?, 47 GONZAGA L. REV. 1,
29 (2011); Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth That Insurance Is Not
Available for IntentionalInjuries or Damage, 8 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 65, 93 (2012);
Adam Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham's The Liability
Century, 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (reviewing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM:
THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

TO 9/11 (2008)). The economic literature on moral hazard is legion. See generally,
e.g., Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stigliz, The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard,90
SCAND. J. ECON. 383 (1988); Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stigliz, Moral Hazard
and Optimal Commodity Taxation, 29 J. PUB. EcON. 1 (1986); Bengt Holmstrm,
Moral Hazardand Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); Steven Shavell, On
Moral Hazardand Insurance,93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
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market. 45 The countervailing tendency of insurers to "cherry-pick"
low-risk clients raises a regulatory concern in its own right, that of
inadequate coverage for individuals of modest means and political
46
power.
Correlation is perhaps the most insidious factor undermining the
financial integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk. The
business of insurance ordinarily relies on the "law of large numbers"
to manage "statistically independent risks," since an increase in "the
number of insured persons possessing independent and identically
valued risks" yields a corresponding improvement to the accuracy of
predicting each individual insured's risk by "the reduction in the
variance of risk of expected outcomes." 4 7 The ability of insurance
pools to segregate high and low risk individuals likewise reduces the
expected cost of insurance by further reducing variance in the
48
expected outcomes of the insured population as a whole.
By contrast, private insurers are extremely loath to cover risks that
are highly correlated to each other.4 9
Coverage liability for
45. See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESA M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
RISK AND INSURANCE 21-22 (10th ed. 2007); see also BANKS MCDOWELL,
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 39 (1989);
Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensationfor Illness and Injury, 93

COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993) (defining adverse selection as "the
disproportionate tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses to seek
insurance against those losses"). But see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). See
generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493-94 (1970).
46. See McDOWELL, supra note 45, at 39.
47. See Priest, The Problem of CatastrophicLoss, supra note 17, at 221.
48. See id. at 222. See generally Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The
Efficiency Effects of CategoricalDiscrimination in the Insurance Industry, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 34 (1986). Formally speaking:
n

k-1

where a,represents the variance within the insurance pool considered as a single
unit and ak represents the variance within one of n subgroups segregated according
to their risk.
49. See, e.g., Patricia Grossi, Howard Kunreuther & Don Windeler, An
Introduction to CatastropheModels and Insurance, in CATASTROPHE MODELING:
A NEW APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 23, 37-38 (Patricia Grossi & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2005).
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simultaneous, geographically concentrated risk can be ruinous to an
insurer. 50 For this reason, insurers routinely exclude coverage for
flood damage (or even water damage more generally), 51 even in
policies that purport to cover all risks. 52 In certain areas, an insurer
asks not whether flooding will occur, but when.5 3
The reluctance of private insurers to cover flood damage arises
from the same financial instinct that counsels investors to diversify
their portfolios by holding asset classes whose correlation, as
measured by the r-squared statistic, is low. 54 Highly correlated
catastrophic risks inflict "numerous losses ... simultaneously from a
single event." 55 High correlation undermines the ability of insurance
markets to rely on "risk aggregation, also known as the law of large
numbers, which specifies that for a series of independent and
identically distributed random variables, the variance of the average
amount of the claim payment decreases as the number of claims
50. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property
Insurance: Financingand Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTG. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 9, 14 (2013); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and
Market Failure in Flood Insurance,26 MIss. C.L. REV. 3, 7 (2006).
51. See generally Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the
Katrina Disaster,Prosser'sFolly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking
the Conundrum, 54 LoY. L. REV. 1 (2008); Brendan R. Vaughn, Watered Down:
Are Insurance Companies Getting Hosed in the Wind Versus Water Controversy?,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 777.
52. See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir.
2007) (evaluating private insurance coverage for damage during Hurricane Katrina
that could be attributable to wind, water, or both phenomena); Tuepker v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2007); Corban v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 20 So. 2d 601, 618 (Miss. 2009). See generally Jennifer
McNair, Note, The Winds of Change: The Mississippi Supreme Court Examines
Concurrent Causation in Hurricane Katrina Claims, 30 Miss. C.L. REV. 579
(2012).
53. Cf Hornstein, supra note 50, at 26 (noting that insurers who fail to secure
approval for rate increases can limit their exposure by refusing to underwrite
policies, limiting maximum coverage, and/or raising deductibles or copayments in
order to pass losses to policyholders).
54. For an explanation of r-squared as the square of the correlation coefficient
in statistics, see ROBERT G.D. STEEL & JAMES H. TORRIE, PRINCIPLES AND
PROCEDURES OF STATISTICS 187, 287 (1960). For an explanation of the use of rsquared in finance, see generally Richard Roll, R 2 , 43 J. FIN. 541 (1988).
55. Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and Instruments for
Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA

89, 93 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
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increases." 56
Aggregating highly correlated risks would force
insurers to perform the "unproductive" and unprofitable task of
maintaining financial reserves that "would equal or, perhaps, exceed
57
the reserves that individuals would have to maintain if uninsured.
Indeed, "[p]roviding coverage of highly correlated losses is exactly
58
the opposite of the risk-reducing function of aggregation.,
Underwriting policies for highly correlated losses such as flood
damage thus inflicts a financial risk that most prudent insurers are
unwilling to bear.59
High levels of correlation among risks may signal a fundamental
flaw in the statistical modeling of a particular hazard. Unexplored or
unexplained connections among correlated risks may be the reason
that statistical models fail so regularly to predict the actual
probability and magnitude of tail risks. Contrary to our assumptions,
these (negative) outcomes are emphatically not independent and
identically distributed. The central limit theorem does not hold, and
problems of correlation and covariance will bedevil efforts to predict
risks and to prescribe responses.60

56. Id. at 92-93.
57. Priest, The Problem of CatastrophicLoss, supra note 17, at 222; see also id.

("Where risks are highly correlated, they cannot be effectively reduced by
spreading them among those subject to the risk" (emphasis in original)).
58. Id. at 226.
59. See McDOWELL, supra note 45, at 39; see generally PAYING THE PRICE:
THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr., eds., 1998); cf

Kunreuther et. al, Should Society Deal with the Earthquake Problem?, supra note

42, at 65 (observing that reinsurers, rather than offering coverage "at an
exorbitantly high premium," prefer instead to "indicate that they do not have
enough capacity" to cover earthquakes and other natural disasters).
60. See OLAV KALLENBERG, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PROBABILITY 66-67
(1997); C.C. Heyde, Central Limit Theorem, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL
SCIENCES 651 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 1983). On nonparametric methods for
testing departures from the central limit theorem's assumption of independent and
identically distributed random variables, see generally SIDNEY SIEGEL & N. JOHN
CASTELLAN, JR., NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d

ed. 1988); A.N. Kolmogoroff, Sulla determinazione empirica di una legge di
distribuzione, 4 G. IST. ITAL. ATTUARI 83 (1933); N. Smirnov, Tablefor Estimating
the Goodness of Fit of Empirical Distributions, 19 ANNALS MATH. STAT. 279
(1948); William H. Kruskal & W. Allen Wallis, Use of Ranks in One-Criterion
Variance Analysis, 47 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 583 (1952); Robert G. Mogull, The OneSample Runs Test: A Category of Exception, 19 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 296
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Correlation within certain classes of losses, such as floods or crop
loss, is so strong (as measured by r-squared or variants on that
mathematical theme) that private insurers ordinarily refuse to
underwrite those risks. The consideration of correlation by property
and casualty insurers mirrors the treatment of correlation in the
management of long asset portfolios, where r-squared and beta play
vital roles in guiding investment decisions. 6 1 Indeed, beta, defined as
the covariance between asset-specific and portfolio-wide returns,
*
divided by the variance of returns within the portfolio, 62 is routinely
treated as the simplest measure of systemic risk that cannot be
managed by mere diversification.6 3 This is the sense in which the P
branch of mathematical finance, or portfolio theory, unites the worlds
of investment, insurance, and disaster policy as distinct but related
manifestations of risk management.64
III. CATASTROPHE BONDS AND THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE RISK
TRANSFER

The emergence of a relatively new method of alternative risk
transfer, the catastrophe bond, unites catastrophic risk management

(1994); N. Smirnov, Table for Estimating the Goodness of Fit of Empirical
Distributions,19 ANNALS MATH. STAT. 279 (1948).
61. See, e.g., Robert A. Korajczyk, INTRODUCTION TO ASSET PRICING AND
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS, at

xv (Robert A. Korajczyk ed., 1999); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427-28
(1964).
62. See Irwin Friend & Marshall Blume, Measurement of Portfolio
Performance Under Uncertainty,60 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565 (1970).
63. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9
MGMT. ScI. 277, 281 (1963); Jack L. Treynor, How to Rate Management of
Investment Funds, 43 HARV. BUS. REV. 63, 66 (1965).
64. See generally, e.g., WEIMIN DONG, BUILDING A MORE PROFITABLE
PORTFOLIO: MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY WITH APPLICATION TO CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE (2001); IOANNIS KARATZAS & STEVEN SHREVE, METHODS OF
MATHEMATICAL FINANCE (1998); ATTILLO MEUCCI, RISK AND ASSET ALLOCATION

(2005); J. David Cummins, Convergence in Wholesale Financial Services:
Reinsurance and Investment Banking, 30 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 187
(2005).
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with other branches of finance and portfolio management. 65 Disaster
law traverses a single continuum of methods for compensation and
risk-spreading. 66 At the most practical level, catastrophe bonds and
similar financial tools bridge the gap between conventional risk
transfer (the traditional business of insurance and reinsurance) and
innovative risk finance.6 7
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake of 1994
inflicted cataclysmic losses on insurers that had underwritten policies
in areas affected by those disasters. 6 8 The insurance industry
responded to these financial meltdowns by seeking alternative ways
to securitize its risks. 69 This quest for alternative methods for risk
transfer culminated in the catastrophe bond. 70 Like all other forms of
65. See Todd V. McMillan, Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond: A
TransactionalIntegration of Industries Through a Capacity-EnhancingProduct of
Risk Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131, 133 (2001).
66. Cf Matthew D. Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some
Cautionary Lessons from Environmental Policy Analysis, 56 DUKE L.J. 1, 44

(2006) (recognizing the value of "using probability distributions" to characterize
and account for "uncertainties in inputs and outputs" in predictive models, as
opposed to "'deterministic' assessment" based on specific "point estimates"). On
methods for assessing risks to human health and/or the environment, see generally
T. COVELLO & MILEY W. MERKHOFER, RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS:
APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1993); ROBYN
VINCENT

RISK ASSESSMENT
APPROACHES,
(1999); HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002); Judson
Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, On the Value of Formal Assessment of Uncertainty in
Regulatory Analysis, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 154 (2007); Dennis J. Paustenbach,
Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 283 (1995).
67. See Vronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Natural
Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks: A Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,136,
FAIRMAN

ET

EXPERIENCES

AL.,

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

INFORMATION

10,137 (2010).
68. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and Catastrophein the Case of
Katrina and Beyond 26 MISS. C.L. REV. 49, 53 (2006) (reporting that Hurricane

Andrew pushed ten insurance companies to the brink of bankruptcy).

See

generally J. David Cummins et al., Can Insurers Pay for the "Big One"?
Measuring the Capacity of the Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic
Losses, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 557 (2002).
69. See Christopher M. Lewis & Peter 0. Davis, CapitalMarket Instrumentsfor
FinancingCatastropheRisk: New Directions?, 17 J. INS. REG. 110, 113 (1998).
70. See generally ERIC BANKS, ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER: INTEGRATED
RISK

MANAGEMENT

MARKETS

(2004);

THROUGH INSURANCE,

ERIC

BANKS,

REINSURANCE,

CATASTROPHIC

RISK:

AND THE CAPITAL

ANALYSIS

AND
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alternative risk transfer, catastrophe bonds enable insurers to acquire
risk-spreading capabilities beyond the traditional financial tools
available to the insurance industry. The ultimate goal is to enable
insurers to derive revenue from sources besides premiums and
returns from investments on reserves built by those premiums. After
all, "[i]nsurers do not simply hang onto premiums ...; they invest
them for the time period between payment of premiums and payment
of losses.,71 Income derived from these investments "allows the
industry to remain profitable as a whole even with significant
negative underwriting losses." 72 In the aftermath of financially
devastating events such as Andrew or the Northridge earthquake, the
insurance industry may not recover more than half of the surplus it
had accumulated from premiums collected before these disasters. 3
Catastrophe bonds transfer risks from the sponsoring insurer or
reinsurer to investors willing to finance a contingent reserve in
exchange for high returns on principal in the event the catastrophe
never materializes. In turn, securitization through catastrophe bonds
extends the financial resources of the insurance and reinsurance
industries.7 4 By harnessing the resources of the capital markets to
provide capacity for selected property/casualty and life/health 7risks,
5
catastrophe bonds "go beyond traditional forms of reinsurance.
Like reinsurance or any other market mechanism available to the
insurance industry, catastrophe bonds work best where highly
(2005); THE HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES
(Pauline Barrieu & Luca Albertini eds., 2009); Sylvie Bouriaux & Richard

MANAGEMENT

MacMinn, Securitization of Catastrophe Risk: New Developments in InsuranceLinked Securities and Derivatives, 32 J. INS. ISSUES 1 (2009); Ernst N. Csiszar, An
Update on the Use of Modern FinancialInstruments in the Insurance Sector, 32

319 (2007). The notion of insurance-linked securities is thought
to have originated with Robert C. Goshay & Richard L. Sandor, An Inquiry into the
Feasibilityof a ReinsuranceFutures Market, 5 J. BUS. FIN. 56 (1973).
71. Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Consideringthe Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422 (1988).
GENEVA PAPERS

72. Id. at 423.
73. See Kunreuther, MitigatingDisasterLosses Through Insurance, supra note
5, at 180. See generally NEIL DOHERTY, LISA POSEY & ANNE KLEFFNER,
INSURANCE SURPLUS: ITS FUNCTION, ITS ACCUMULATION AND ITS DEPLETION

(1992).
74. See Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing InsuranceRisks, 19
ANN.REV. BANKING L. 203, 205-06 (2000).

75. Heidi E. Hutter, Convergence and Innovation: Developments in the
Reinsurance Marketplace,44 RISK MGMT. 57, 58 (Sept. 1997).
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correlated, "locally dependent risks" are nevertheless "globally
independent" and therefore capable of diversification within a pool of
76
deeper financial resources.
Interest in catastrophe bonds as a way
of extending the capacity of the private insurance market to pay
claims arising from disasters has reached New York in the immediate
aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the event that inspired this
symposium. 77 Historically, the domain of developed economies and
the insurers who serve those markets, catastrophe bonds have drawn
78
79
the attention of Latin American governments and the World Bank.

To issue a catastrophe bond, an insurance company forms a special
purpose reinsurance vehicle, typically underwritten by an investment
bank chartered in an offshore jurisdiction (such as the Cayman
Islands) known for relaxed financial regulation." Catastrophe bonds
are typically structured as floating rate bonds whose principal is lost
if specified trigger conditions are met. 8 1 If no catastrophe occurs, the
bonds pay a generous coupon to investors. 82 If a catastrophe does
occur, the bondholders would forgive the principal. 83 Those funds
76. J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for
Catastrophes?,88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LouIs REV. 337, 343 (2006).
77. See Georgia Levenson Keohane, Op-Ed, Preparingfor Disasterby Betting
Against
It,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
12,
2014,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/preparing-for-disaster-by-bettingagainst-it/#more-151853 (reporting how New York's Metropolitan Transit
Authority, "[i]n the wake of Sandy," had worked with "the First Mutual
Transportation Assurance Company," the MTA's own "'captive' (or in-house)
insurer to obtain reinsurance ... by issuing the world's first 'catastrophe' bond
designed specifically to protect against storm surge").
78. See Searchlight Process, Catastrophe Bonds: Financial Innovations
Insuring Against Severe Climate Events (Or High-Loss Level Events),
FUTURECHALLENGES.ORG
(Jan
4,
2013),
http://futurechallenges.org/local/searchlight/catastrophe-bonds-financialinnovations-insuring-against-severe-climate-events-or-high-loss-level-events.
79. See MultiCat Program, TREASURY.WORLDBANK.ORG (April 26, 2011),
available at http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/MultiCat ProductNote.pdf
(describing the World Bank's MultiCat program, "a catastrophe bond issuance
platform that allows governments to use a standard framework to buy insurance on
affordable terms through the capital markets" as part of the Bank's "broad
spectrum of disaster risk financing instruments offered ... to assist member
countries in planning efficient responses to catastrophic events").
80. See McMillan, supra note 65, at 140.
81. See id. at 140, 140 n.17.
82. See id. at 140.
83. See id. at 141.
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would then enable the insurer to honor claims arising from the
disaster.84
In an ideal circumstance, one in which a catastrophe bond's
principal exceeds the issuer's liability for payments on a disaster, the
forgiveness of the obligation to repay principal on a catastrophe bond
allows the insurer to write down that liability and thereby realize an
immediate increase in its net worth. 85 This benefit to insurers
reinforces investors' interest in catastrophe bonds' ability to deliver
generous returns that do not correlate with conventional stocks and
bonds. 86 On the other hand, if the scale of a disaster exceeds the
principal on a related catastrophe bond, the insurer and any reinsurers
would face an all-too-familiar situation: falling short of the funds
needed to satisfy claims arising from the disaster.
Whether catastrophe bonds will significantly enhance the ability of
private insurers and reinsurers to manage catastrophic risk without
governmental intervention depends on the ability of catastrophe
bonds to outperform competing financial tools at the disposal of
insurance and reinsurance carriers. 87 Studies by the Government
Accountability Office suggest that transaction costs may consume as
much as two percent of the insurance coverage provided by a
catastrophe bond. 88 If these transaction costs are analogized to the
expense ratio on financial instruments, they would align the
managerial expense of catastrophe bonds with that of very expensive

84. See id. at 140.

85. See id. at 170; see also

INSURANCE

SERVICES

OFFICE,

FINANCING

n.1 (Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.iso.com/Research-and-Analyses/Studies-and-Whitepapers/FinancingCatastrophe-Risk-Capital-Market-Solutions.html.
86. See generally MILKEN INSTITUTE, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS FOR
CATASTROPHE RISK: CAT BONDS AND BEYOND (2008); J. David Cummins &
Philippe Trainar, Securitization,Insurance, and Reinsurance, 76 J. RISK & INS. 463
CATASTROPHE RISK: CAPITAL MARKET SOLUTIONS 1

(2009); Robert H. Litzenberger et al., Assessing CatastropheReinsurance-Linked

Securities as a New Asset Class, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., 76 (Winter 1996);
McMillan, supra note 65, at 170-71.
87. See Bruggeman, supra note 67, at 10,141-42.
88. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-941, CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE

RISKS:

THE

ROLE

OF RISK-LINKED

SECURITIES

AND

FACTORS

AFFECTING THEIR USE (2002); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-031033, CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE RISKS: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO SECURITIZE
NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISK (2003); Bruggeman, supra note 67,

at 10,142.
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mutual funds" or of hedge funds. 9° Whatever its future contribution
to catastrophic risk management in disaster law, the catastrophe bond

concept has already proved elastic enough to provide an alternative
method for managing the risk of catastrophic audit failure in
securities regulation. 91

89. One study of mutual funds, admittedly conducted before the rise of
exchange-traded funds and their downward pressure on mutual fund fees, found
that mutual funds reported an average expense ratio of 1.14 percent. See Mark M.
Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 59 (1997). In
addition, 64.5 percent of the funds in that study charged load fees, which in turn
averaged 7.33 percent. See id.
90. Hedge funds appear to charge annual management fees with a mean and
median of 1 percent, plus performance fees whose mean is 14 percent and whose
median is 20 percent. See Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge
Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 834, 842 (1999); cf Paul
Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital

Partnership,51 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 14 (1999) (revealing that 81 percent of venture
capital funds have incentive fees of 20 to 21 percent despite a wider range of
incentive fees from less than 1 percent to 45 percent). These findings confirm the
popular perception that the typical hedge fund charges a 2 percent management fee,
plus a 20 percent performance fee. See Gregory Zuckerman, Juliet Chung &
Michael Corkery, Hedge Funds Cut Back on Fees: Pressure From Disappointed
Investors Changes "2 and 20" Model, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2013, available at

http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732389300457905495280755635
2;

See

generally

Two

and

Twenty,

Investopedia,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/two and twenty.asp (last visited Oct. 26,
2014).
91. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An
Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 763-64 (2007).
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Catastrophe bonds, however, have not yet fully transformed
property and casualty insurance markets. One skeptical view of
catastrophe bonds warns
that "[t]he rise of cat
DisasterappeaL
nd:ng,$bii
bIn *tstro hc, -Ids
other
and
bonds
'insurance-linked
20
may
securities"'
negatively "affect the
15
price of insurance."' 92
Worse still, catastrophe
I
bonds may attract so
many
unsophisticated,
poorly informed investors

as to give rise to a "frothy
'shadow insurance' sector
197 P 00 03 05 07 09 1113
systemic
with
' 93
implications.
Closer examination undermines the premises on which this dire
warning rests. As the above graphic shows, $19 billion catastrophe
bonds was outstanding as of 2013. As large as this number may
seem in absolute terms, it represents a relatively modest share of the
overall property and casualty insurance market. The $19 billion
catastrophe bond market "is a small fraction of the $300 billion in
catastrophe-related payouts" for which insurers bear potential
liability.94 Catastrophe bonds comprise an even smaller share of net
written premiums, estimated to run about $425 billion a year as of
2010. 95 These instruments have at most modest impact on a "global
property and casualty insurance market [that] had total gross written
premiums of $1,383.4 billion in 2011, representing a compound
annual growth rate ... of 3.1 % between 2007 and 2011U96

92. Perilous Paper: Bonds That Pay Out When CatastropheStrikes Are Rising
in Popularity, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2013.

This article is the source of the

graphic embedded in the text.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. See Felix Salmon, The Tiny Cat-Bond Market, REUTERS (April 25, 2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/04/25/the-tiny-cat-bond-market.
96. MARKETLINE,

GLOBAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE

(May 23,

2012) (summarized at
http://www.marketresearch.com/MarketLine-v3883/Global-Property-CasualtyInsurance-7016947).
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According to Felix Salmon, "catastrophe bonds are the capitalmarkets security of the future, and they always will be.",9 7 Salmon
argues that two fundamentally different types of risk divide insurers
from the investors they hope to invite into financial markets for
indemnifying catastrophic risk. In as much as insurers and the
insured want payouts defined according to losses, insurance markets
operate on indemnity risk. 98 By contrast, would-be bondholders want
payouts triggered by the "magnitude of earthquakes as measured by
the modified Mercalli scale; hurricanes as measured by wind speed,"
99
and other indicia of parametricrisk.
These are issues that can be addressed, at least at the margin,
through improvements in the design of catastrophe bonds as financial
instruments. Indemnity risk and parametric risk represent opposite
ends of the spectrum of traditional triggers for catastrophe bond
payouts, a range that also contemplates forgiveness of cat bond
principal based on notional portfolio (modeled loss) or industry loss
triggers. Parametric triggers are certainly most attractive to investors
because of their lack of correlation to insurers' financial needs and
resources. As Salmon argues, this very lack of correlation with
actual indemnity payments is what repels insurance companies from
the catastrophe bond market.10 0
This conflict arises, however, only to the extent that catastrophe
bonds must perilously lurch between the extremes of indemnity risk
and parametric risk. In practice, catastrophe bond triggers offer a
fuller range of options.10 1 An indemnity trigger bases recovery "on
the [bond] sponsor's actual losses, just as in most reinsurance
contracts." A notional portfolio or modeled loss trigger calculates
forgiveness of cat bond principal according to "actual events'
parameters, such as magnitude and epicenter location for
earthquakes," which a modeling agent in turn recreates within a

97. Salmon, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. Id. See generally Lauren Brooks, The Caribbean CatastrophicRisk Facility:
ParametricInsurancePayouts Without ProperParameters,2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 135 (2012).

100. See Salmon, supra note 95.
101. See DAVID A. LALONDE ET AL., So You WANT TO ISSUE A CAT BOND (Air

Currents, Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.airworldwide.com/_public/NewsData/00 1410 /AIRCurrentsCatBond.pdf).
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proprietary catastrophe model in order to "estimat[e] their financial
impact on the notional portfolio originally used to estimate the
bond's risk., 10 2 An industry loss trigger is "based on actual losses to
the insurance industry as a whole," usually based on the modeling
agent's "own database of insured industry exposure to estimate the
bond's probability of being triggered." Bond purchasers may also
conduct their own "risk analysis of the sponsor's portfolio ... in order
to estimate correlations between the sponsor and the industry's risk
profile, and [to] select an industry loss trigger that will minimize
basis risk."
Finally, a parametric trigger relies "on objective
measurements, such as a hurricane's maximum wind speed and
landfall location, or the ground motion measured by multiple
seismometers after an earthquake. 10 3
Given the availability of other benchmarks, such as losses within a
notional portfolio of insurance policies or losses across the entire
property and casualty insurance industry, catastrophe bond triggers
need not force a binary choice between perfectly correlated
indemnity risk (which favors insurers) and optimally uncorrelated
environmental parameters (which attract catastrophe bond investors).
For instance, parametric index triggers seek to combine
environmental parameters with industry loss metrics by using models
that calculate approximate loss as a function of environmental
parameters (such as wind speed at differing locations) and use those
models to calculate the bond's payout function.10 4
IV. PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN DISASTER INSURANCE MARKETS
A. The Samaritan'sDilemma.
Avoiding CatastrophicResponses to CatastrophicRisks
The immaturity and modest size of emerging markets for
catastrophe bonds and other forms of alternative risk transfer,
coupled with enduring constraints on the capacity of private
insurance markets, leave significant room for governmental

102. Id. at 4.
103. Id.
104. See A.M.
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available
http://www3 .ambest.com/ambv/ratingmethodology/OpenPDF.aspx?rc- 197690.
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(2012),
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1 5
intervention in mitigating and compensating catastrophic losses. 0
This is to say nothing of "cataclysmic, or globally undiversifiable"
events - "events that are so severe that they may not be diversifiable
even through securities markets. ' 1° 6 Within the United States, the
federal government has subsidized disaster insurance, directly
underwritten policies that private insurers are unwilling to issue, or
served as reinsurer of last resort. In many markets, government has
pursued some combination of these strategies. Proper calibration of
disaster law and policy demands an understanding of the pitfalls that
await each of the flawed strategies available to governments.
Investments in disaster preparedness, or "important potential
precautionary strategies that are designed to minimize the expected
cost of or consequences associated with a natural disaster," exhibit
"many of the characteristics of public goods., 10 7 Many of the
precautionary measures that can be expected to blunt disaster's blow
may "enjoy significant economies of scale, require the exercise of
powers of eminent domain ... , and/or exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics."10 8 These economic traits describe "many ... forms
of public infrastructure" and - increasingly so in a society guided by
data-driven analytics -"the
generation and provision of information
relating to the underlying risks and expected costs of locating in
vulnerable areas, weather forecasts of impending storms ... and so
forth." 109
Governments may be ideally situated to coordinate physical
infrastructure, such as levees or dikes, with informational platforms,
such as monitoring and early warning systems for storms or

105. See, e.g., Priest, The Problem of CatastrophicLoss, supra note 17, at 225

("In the most common view, the government is regarded as the most effective
insurance instrument of the society, with increasing effectiveness as potential
disasters increase in scale.
[T]he state can spread risks most broadly because it
is the largest social entity in existence."). For paradigmatic expressions of this
perspective, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970);
see Kunreuther, MitigatingDisasterLosses Through Insurance,supra note 5.

106. Cummins, supra note 76, at 344 (emphases in original).

See generally

Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, CatastropheInsurance, CapitalMarkets, and
UninsurableRisk, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205 (1997).

107. Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 55, at 92.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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earthquakes. 110 In harmony with these principles, Congress in 2012
directed the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) to
develop a protocol and database for allocating losses between water
and wind in "named" storms. 111 In addition to directing FEMA to
use the "most accurate data" in formulating flood maps in 100-year
floodplains, 500-year floodplains, and "residual risk areas," Congress
- in what may be its most significant move to improve the
informational basis by which the federal government prepares for
floods - has appropriated $400 million each year to fund FEMA's
nationwide flood-mapping activities. 112 In so doing, Congress has
finally fulfilled the tantalizing promise of the unenacted Natural
Disaster Protection Act of 1993,113 which would have required

FEMA to identify, on a peril-by-peril basis, which states were most
at risk from hurricanes, floods, windstorms, earthquakes, and
volcanic eruptions.'14
The case for public intervention in disaster finance is comparably
strong. Like other forms of preparedness for disaster, insurance is
"likely to be under-demanded and under-supplied" if catastrophic
risk transfer is "left purely to private markets."'1 15 Indeed, the case
for comprehensive disaster insurance, including public subsidies for
types of coverage that private carriers find most unpalatable, was
made half a century ago and remains mostly unrebutted on purely
utilitarian grounds. 116 Global data comparing the relative resilience
110. See Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY

113, 134 (1996).

111. See Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §100251, 126 Stat. 916, 969; Hornstein, supra note 50,
at 31.
112. See Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100216(b), (f), 126 Stat. 916, 927; Hornstein, supra
note 50, at 33.
113. S. 1350, 103d Cong; see also Natural Disaster Protection Partnership Act of
1994, H.R. 2873, 103d Cong.
114. See generally Epstein, supra note 8, at 296-97.
115. Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 55, at 92.
116. See Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive DisasterInsurance,
11 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1968); cf Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk-Bearing:
Small and Great Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103 (1996); Howard
Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural DisasterInsurance?,
in ON RISK AND DISASTER, LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 55, at
175. But see Priest, The Problem of CatastrophicLoss, supra note 17, at 219-20
(disputing "[v]irtually all [other] approaches to the problem of catastrophic loss,
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of larger, developed countries vis-d-vis their smaller, less developed
counterparts suggests that the best indicators of macroeconomic
robustness and recovery after disaster are those that correlate most
strongly with financial capacity to withstand a shock, to prevent
spillovers into the broader economy, and to marshal resources for
reconstruction.1 1 7
Yet financial preparedness for disaster, no less than physical and
informational precautions, remains an "accident waiting to
happen. ' ' 1 8 Like private financial actors, government is vulnerable
to the effects of risk and uncertainty when it makes its own decisions
to invest, whether in precaution or in infrastructure subject to
catastrophic loss. 119

Whereas problems such as adverse selection,

moral hazard, and - above all else - mismatches in statistical
correlation cripple private insurance markets, the political economy
of public disaster assistance destroys any coherent governmental
approach to risk transfer. 12 Despite growing corporate awareness
that private insurance coverage remains severely limited, the federal
government - with the salient exception of the National Flood

[which] conclude that the magnitude and character of such losses compel[] some
form of governmental solution, whether in the form of ex post disaster assistance or
ex ante regulation to reduce exposure").
117. See Ilan Noy, The Macroeconomic Consequences of Disasters, 88 J. DEV.
EcON. 221, 221 (2009); cf DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A
HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (1999)
(observing that "developing nations are less able to afford disaster detection
technology and resilient construction practices," much as "stratification" along
lines of "socioeconomic status, gender, and race or ethnicity" in the United States
and other developed countries "results in an uneven distribution of exposure and
vulnerability to hazards, disaster losses," and diminished "access to aid, recovery,
and reconstruction").
118. See Benoit & Dubra, supra note 6, at 787. See generally VfRONIQUE
REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL

BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS:

ECONOMICS APPROACH

A

COMPARATIVE LAW AND

(2010).

119. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of
Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 364 (1970); accord Louis A.
Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY

167, 174 n.17 (1991).
120. See William F. Shughart II, The Politics and Economics of DisasterRelief
127 PUB. CHOICE 31, 31 (2006) ("no one should ... expect[] government to be any
more effective when confronted with natural disaster than it is in more mundane
circumstances").
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Insurance Act of 1968121 and the concomitant establishment of the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) - "has not intervened in
insurance markets to enhance coverage available for victims of
natural disaster. ' ' 122 As in so many other facets of disaster policy, the
lack of financial preparedness for catastrophe arises from political
failures to address market failures.
Government systematically underinvests in disaster preparedness
ex ante and overinvests in disaster relief ex post.123 Even though
precautionary investments ex ante may "reduce the risk and
magnitude of damage from disasters" on a cost-effective basis, "the
results are relatively more uncertain and less tangible" than dramatic,
even heroic ex post measures such as "[s]ending in troops, personnel,
and food and medical supplies.",124 Worse still, politicians reap
immediate rewards from ex post relief, but may wait in vain for
dividends from ex ante preparation.125 Politicians "prefer" (and
pursue) "policies that yield tangible benefits for constituents in the
near term. ,,126 And with good reason: voters reward incumbent
politicians for making relief expenditures after disaster, but not for
investing in preparedness before disaster.127 This dynamic has
transmogrified ad hoc relief under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster

121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2012).
122. Robert H. Jerry II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835,
875 (2006).
123. See Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and
Demand of DisasterManagement, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 103 (2006).
124. Id. at 111; see also id. ("[A] local municipality's stringent enforcement of
building codes will receive less attention than the ex post rescue efforts after a
building collapse, even though preventing code violations may save more lives.").
125. Id.
126. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 137 (2004); accord Depoorter, supra
note 123, at 111.
127. See Healy & Malhotra, supra note 4, at 397; see also id. at 388 ("[V]oters
offer scant incentive to presidents to pursue cost-effective preparedness spending,
but do encourage them to send in the cavalry after damage has been done and lives
have been lost."); cf Justin Pidot, DeconstructingDisaster, 2013 BYU L. REV.
213, 233 n.102 ("Describing those assisting with disaster response as the cavalry,
even if they have no relationship to the military, is not uncommon."). For legal
analysis of actual military involvement in disaster response, see William Banks,
Who's in Charge: The Role of the Military in DisasterResponse, 26 MISS. C.L.
REV.

75 (2006).
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Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,128 originally conceived as a
limited stopgap for disasters exceeding local and129
state resources, into
a quasi-entitlement of first rather than last resort.
Along every dimension - spatial, temporal, and behavioral - the
political economy of disaster assistance dictates perverse
outcomes. 13 In the logic and language of collective action, disaster
relief presents a problem of concentrated benefits and diffuse
costs. 13
Though local governments are all too eager to "allow
development to occur where it should not" and to relax protective
land use regulation, all in the name of enhanced property tax
revenues, local governments willingly export "the costs of disaster...
to the federal government. ' ,132 For its part, the federal government
allocates more disaster expenditures in states whose representatives
1 33
sit on congressional committees charged with overseeing FEMA.
Political cycles, alas, are shorter than the time horizons on which
1 34
economically optimal disaster planning should take place.
Disasters that occur during election years draw more ex post, ad hoc

128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208 (2012).
129. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding PublicAcquisition of
Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 328-31

(2003).
130. See Charles Cohen & Eric Werker, The Political Economy of "Natural"
Disasters,52 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 795 (2008).
131. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Gary Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371

(1983).
132. Pidot, supra note 127, at 246.
133. See Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The PoliticalEconomy of FEMA
Disaster Payments, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 496 (2003); cf Thomas A. Garrett, et al.,
PoliticalAllocation of US Agriculture Disaster Payments in the 1990s, 26 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 143, 157 (2006) ("[T]otal [agricultural] disaster payments are

about $44 million higher in those states having representation on the House
Appropriations subcommittee.").
134. See Depoorter, supra note 123. at 112 ("[T]he political benefits of ex ante
preparation policies and may accrue beyond the time horizons of many
politicians."); cf Howard Kunreuther, Long-Term Contractsfor Reducing Losses
from Future Catastrophes, in LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES: STRATEGIES FOR
REACTION AND RESPONSE, supra note 31, at 235, 236-39 (describing the

disinclination of homeowners and businesses to evaluate investments in disaster
preparedness on a time horizon exceeding two or three years).
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funding. 135 Roughly a quarter of federal disaster relief for farmers
appears to be politically motivated. 136 As much as half of all federal
disaster relief may be traceable to political rather than environmental
or economic considerations. 137 Disaster relief epitomizes the practice
of "fiat givings," whereby "the government declares - either
expressly or by implication - that it will not permit... property to
move, erode, or disappear."' 138 In the politics of extreme natural
139
events, it is a short path indeed from compassion to entitlement.
The politicization of disaster relief punishes not only the public
fisc, but also the politicians themselves. Put simply, "disaster relief
breeds public corruption., 140 The political economy of disaster relief
often delivers sudden "windfalls" into stricken areas, and the political
imperative to be perceived as proactive creates conditions "ripe for
corruption and waste. 141 Ceteris paribus, politicians from disaster142
prone states are likelier to be indicted and convicted of corruption.
Behavioral constraints on human and institutional decisionmaking
further pervert disaster policy. The endowment effect, a bedrock
element of humans' innate heuristics for evaluating risk, 143 leads
135. See Leonard & Howitt, supra note 31; Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Haven't You
Switched to Risk Management 2. 0 Yet?, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING
DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD

41 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic

eds., 2006).
136. See Garrett et al., supra note 133, PoliticalAllocation of US Agriculture
DisasterPayments in the 1990s, at 159 ("[A]lmost 12-30% of all direct agricultural
disaster relief is due to political influence rather than actual crop and feed losses.").
137. See Garrett & Sobel, supra note 133, at 509.
138. Barnhizer, supra note 129, at 320-21.
139. See RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
EXTREME NATURAL EVENTS 11 (1999); see also id. at 57-58 (characterizing
"disaster gerrymandering" as a species of off-budget pork barrel politics).
140. William F. Shughart II, Disaster Relief as Bad Public Policy, 15 INDEP.
REV. 519, 521 (2011).
141. Id.; see also Peter Boettke et al., The Political, Economic, and Social
Aspects of Katrina, 74 S. ECON. J. 363, 367-68 (2005); Peter T. Leeson & Russell
S. Sobel, Weathering Corruption,51 J.L. & ECON. 667, 667-69 (2008).
142. Shughart, supra note 140, at 521; cf Nejat Anbarci, et al., Earthquake
Fatalities:The Interactionof Nature and PoliticalEconomy, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1907
(2005) (documenting the impact of political corruption on fatalities associated with
earthquakes).
143. See, e.g., Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone:How Value
Can Appear So Different to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 360,
361-63 (2000); Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss
Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 119, 119 (2005).
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governments to overvalue pre-disaster wealth and to take
economically unwarranted account of sunk costs. 144 It is politically
impossible to refuse aid "once there are identified victims ... featured
on the evening news. '' 145 Indeed, disaster relief hinges on the timing
of a disaster within the news cycle: the relative abundance or scarcity
of other newsworthy events affects the magnitude of the aid that
government grants to any particular disaster. 146 Neither economic
wisdom nor constitutional restraint can withstand
the political
"imperative to respond to blameless suffering., 147
Salience, not sanity, dives the political economy of disaster law as
a branch of prospect theory.14 8 Too often disaster policy falls under
144. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Hold-Up Problem: Why It Is Urgent to Rethink the
Economics of Disaster Insurance Protection, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST,

supra note 135, at 142, 145.
On sunk costs, see, for example, Alenco
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that
"historical investments" in legacy infrastructure are "sunk costs" and have no
relevance to contemporary business decisions in competitive markets whose prices
respond solely "to current costs"); Fresno Mobile Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 165 F.3d
965, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1999); ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN,
EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION 222 (3rd ed. 1983) (observing that the cost of an
item, "once ... acquired," is "irrelevant to any future decision"); JAMES D.
GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS 417-19 (4th ed. 1982) ("If they are
to minimize costs, business decision-makers must recognize the irrelevance of sunk
costs."); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 291 (1997) ("The
irrelevance of sunk costs explains how real businesses make decisions."); ROBERT
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBENFELD, MICROECNOOMICS § 7.1, at 199 (2d ed.
1992) (arguing that sunk costs, though "usually visible," nevertheless "should
always be ignored when making economic decisions"); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 7 (3d ed. 1986) ("[C]ost to an economist is
a forward-looking concept"; costs already incurred "do not affect decisions on
price and quantity."); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
227 (19th ed. 2010) ("One of the most important lessons of economics is that you
should look at the marginal costs and marginal benefits of decisions and ignore past
or sunk costs.").
145. Viscusi, supra note 144, at 146. See generally David Moss, The Peculiar
Politics ofAmerican DisasterPolicy: How Television Has ChangedFederalRelief,

in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST, supra note 135, at 151, 155-59.
146. See Thomas Eisensee & David Strmberg, News Droughts, News Floods,
and U.S. DisasterRelief, 122 Q.J. ECON. 693 (2007).
147. MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 6 (2013).
148. See generally, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW

(2012); Hein Fennema & Peter Wakker, Original and Cumulative Prospect
Theory: A Discussion ofEmpiricalDifferences, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 53
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the sway of the gambler's fallacy 149 and "overinvest[s] in
reconstruction in the wake of disaster based on a mistaken
assumption that a period of repose and relative safety will follow." 15
In a manifestation of the availability heuristic, which hinges on the
salience of data taken into account during decision-making, 151 the
public may fall into a dangerous complacency after "a long period of
calm," "as though... natural hazards no longer exist. ' 152 Finally,
under the influence of the affect heuristic,1 53 disaster policy may
evaluate the magnitude of risk and expected loss according to raw
likes and dislikes.154 One of the more obvious and expensive
examples of
this trap in action is the law's treatment of beachfront
15 5
property.
The iron cross of public choice and behavioral economics subjects
disaster law to a form of moral hazard unique to the formulation of
governmental
policies
for
compensation,
recovery,
and
reconstruction after catastrophe.1 56 "[G]overnment relief distorts
insurance decisions and [individual] behavior" because individuals
ignore the fact that "their incentives to reduce risk affect the expected
cost of government relief. 1 57 So treacherous is the terrain that this
special case of moral hazard deserves a name of its own: charity
(1997); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of
Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
149. See Tristam McPherson, Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism, 3 J.
ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 2, 20 (209); Stephen P. Stitch & Richard E. Nisbett,
Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning, 47 PHIL. SCI. 188, 192-93
(1988).
150. Pidot, supra note 127, at 138.
151. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998).
152. Pidot, supra note 127, at 213.
153. See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristicin Judgments
of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 2 (2000).
154. See Pidot, supra note 127, at 242.
155. See id.; cf Houck, supra note 2, at 43 ("The property rights movement is
nowhere stronger than on the American coastline ..., and it loves insurance
payouts and second home mortgage deductions and it hates planning.").
156. See generally PLATT, supra note 139, at 37-41; Mark Pauly, Overinsurance
and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44 (1974).
157. Kaplow, supra note 119, at 168.
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hazard.I18 Because people "typically are unaware of the hazards they
face," they "rely heavily on emergency relief when the need
arises." 159 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to declare that disaster
victims rely on the provision of ex post relief.160 Charity hazard
poses a true Samaritan's dilemma: at the individual as well as the
society level, post hoc disaster relief strongly breeds reliance on
wealth transfers whose greatest inefficiency lies in their erosion
of
161
disaster.
for
preparedness
ante
ex
optimal
incentives to pursue

B. REFORM AND (INCIPIENT) RETRENCHMENT
IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
162
Even a cursory look at the National Flood Insurance Program,
the United States' most celebrated and comprehensive system of
publicly subsidized disaster insurance, confirms these economic
weaknesses in disaster law and policy. The NFIP was not originally
designed to be actuarially sound. 163 NFIP premiums, whether
calculated according to FEMA's modeling of flood risk or
consciously discounted, were supposed to be sufficient to cover
claims in an "average historical loss year," or the mean annual loss
over the life of the program.164

158. See Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hanneman, Charity Hazard- A
Real Hazard to Natural Disasters?, 7 ENVTL. HAZARDS 321, 321 (2007); cf
Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, Charity Hazard in Crop Insurance (April
14, 2014) (working paper available at http://deryugina.com/2014-0414CharityHazard.pdf).
159. MILETI, supra note 117, at 136-37.
160. See Zeckhauser, supra note 110, at 130.
161. See Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government
Transfer Policy, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 46, 46-47 (1995).
162. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4131 (2012). See generally Charles T. Griffith, The
National Flood Insurance Program: UnattainedPurposes, Liability in Contract
and Takings, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 727 (1994).
163. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-183T,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, (2005) (testimony of William 0.

Jennings, Jr., Director of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Opportunity).
164. See Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, AddressingAffordability in the
National FloodInsurance, 1 J. EXTREME EVENTS 1450, 1451 (2014).
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The NFIP departed in two respects from the process by which a
private insurer would set an actuarially fair premium. First, a private
insurer would consider catastrophic as well as average loss years.
Second, a private insurer would account for the cost of capital,
including the cost of holding capital reserves required by insurance
regulators. 16 5 Even worse, the NFIP appears to have engaged in no
166
choosing the hundred-year "base flood"
rigorous analysis at all in
1 67
as its actuarial baseline.
Historically, the federal approach to flood insurance rested on the
goal of keeping premiums low enough to keep property owners and
insurers within the NFIP, without lowering premiums to the point of
even more aggressively subsidizing high-risk behavior.168
In
prescribing guidelines for NFIP premium rates, Congress was willing
to accept rates that were either "adequate, on the basis of accepted
actuarial principles, to provide reserves for anticipated losses" or in the case of rates "less than such" an actuarially sound "amount" "consistent with the objective of making flood insurance available
where necessary at reasonable rates so as to encourage prospective
insureds to purchase such insurance."1 6 9 The NFIP's discounts were
neither means-tested nor otherwise targeted at lower-income

165. See id.
166. See 44 C.F.R. § 9.4 (2014) ("Base Flood means the flood which has a one
percent chance of being equalled or exceeded in any given year [also known as a
100-year flood]. This term is used in the National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP]
to indicate the minimum level of flooding to be used by a community in its
floodplain management regulations,"); id. § 59.1 (defining a "100-year flood" as a
"flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given
year"). For technical details on the computation of an exceedance probability such
as the NFIP's 100-year "base flood" concept, see generally Grossi et al., supra note
49, at 29-32.
167. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ANALYSIS AND UNCERTAINTY IN

142-43 (2000). Matthew Adler treats this
"intuitive" but unsystematic policy choice as evidence that environmental law in
general and disaster policy in particular should eschew "arbitrary non-zero
numerical cutoffs." See Adler, supra note 66, at 31-35.
168. See Legislative Proposals to Reform the National Flood Insurance
FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES

Program:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on House and Community Opportunity of
the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111 th Cong. 8 (2010).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 4015(b)(2) (2012).
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homeowners. 170 Even at subsidized rates, homeowners failed to buy
"below-cost17 1NFIP flood insurance to complement their all peril ...
coverage."
The actual administration of the NFIP compounded the
inefficiencies of the program's pricing policies. FEMA has
consciously set flood insurance rates on a nationwide basis. This
practice defeats any hope that premiums might reflect regional, local,
and individualized "topographic factors that are relevant to flood
risk. ' , 172 FEMA historically allowed "grandfathered properties" to
keep lower premiums known to fall short of reflecting the actual risk
of flooding and covering expected losses; worse still, the agency
elected not to collect data on the full financial impact of
grandfathering.1 73 NFIP rates have never been set according to
"market forces - which would tend to eliminate actuarially unsound
' 174
rates - but by political forces and special interests."
These flaws in the design of the NFIP compounded the unintended
effect of risk management for flood-prone regions: although
measures such as the construction of levees may reduce the
probability of flooding, those steps invite further settlement in
floodplains and thereby increase the magnitude of losses incurred
during floods. 17 5 The NFIP nevertheless flashed promise as the one
policy tool that has delivered even modest ' historical
success in
"guid[ing] development away from floodplains. 1 76

170. See Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, supra
note 116, at 161-62; Edward T. Pasterick, The NationalFlood Insurance Program,
in PAYING THE PRICE, supra note 59, at 125.

171. Hornstein, supra note 50, at 15.
172. U.S. GOV'T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 4 (2008).

GAO-09-12, FEMA's

173. See id. at 20-21.

174. Barnhizer, supra note 129, at 336.
175. See MILETI, supra note 117, at 25-26.
176. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program
and Louisiana, 60 TULANE L. REV. 61, 160 (1985); see also Charlene Luke &
Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood
Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 8 (2011-12) (observing that individuals may

"participate in the NFIP" only if "their communities agree to abide by [federal]
regulations intended to mitigate flood loss"); Scales, supra note 50, at 12 ("NFIPbacked insurance was conceived as a way of inducing communities to adopt flood
mitigation policies that the federal government ...
could not compel.").
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In what was almost certainly "the largest revamping of the flood
,,177 theaer
insurance program since its origin in 1968,
the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Relief Act of 2012178 made considerable progress
toward the elusive goal of placing the NFIP on actuarially sound
footing. Put simply, Biggert-Waters "mark[s] the beginning of the
end for NFIP's historically below-market insurance rates for flood
insurance."'1 79 Prospectively, all new policies issued within the NFIP
must insure homes according to "actuarial rates."18 0 Biggert-Waters
adopts an aggressive schedule for phasing out subsidized rates on
flood insurance for second homes, business properties, and properties
that have suffered multiple severe flood losses. Flood insurance
premiums on these properties are to rise 25 percent per year until
they reach "full actuarial cost." 181 The vast majority of homes
currently insured under the NFIP are subject to an only modestly
slower schedule (20 percent per year) that is designed to phase in
actuarially accurate rates within five years. 182 If successful, the
Biggert-Waters reform would address three of the NFIP's historical
shortcomings: the failure to encourage widespread uptake of flood
insurance, the failure to spur more prudent floodplain management,
and the utter lack of long-run actuarial soundness. 183
The economic wisdom of the Biggert-Waters reform lies beyond
serious dispute. A commitment to zero governmental relief provides
a "unique optimum" solution for natural disasters, even where private
expenditures to reduce risk are "not observable by insurance
companies" and moral hazard reaches its apex. 184 The prevalence of
exclusions, deductions, and coinsurance requirements, even in
settings where private insurers have full control of underwriting,
suggests that the reduction of moral hazard promises the ability to
177. Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: SmarterSafer.org and the Biggert-Waters
Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 351, 352 (2013).
178. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 916 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129).
179. Hornstein, supra note 50, at 32.
180. Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205, 126 Stat. 916, 917 (2012).

181. Id. § 100205(a), 126 Stat. at 917.
182. Id. § 100207, 126 Stat. at 919.
183. See Thomas L. Hayes & D. Andrew Neal, Actuarial Rate Review: In
Support of the Recommended October 1, 2011 Rate and Rule Changes (FEMA
2011), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-180925045-2347/actuarial rate review2011.txt); Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note
164, at 3.
184. Kaplow, supra note 119, at 172.

2014]

CORRELATION, COVERAGE, AND CATASTROPHE

89

offer insurance to a broader swath of the population, at reduced cost
for all participants. 185 Even where governmental intervention is
warranted on grounds of efficiency, as in instances where "some
individuals may incorrectly perceive the probability of loss,"
"[c]ompulsory government insurance" based on "actuarially fair
premiums" would be superior to the dispensing of disaster relief on
an ad hoc basis. 186 Financially sound disaster policy should strive to
enable an actuarially sound system of "insurance [to] mimic any level
of government relief' and thereby to reduce the degree to which
"[g]overnment relief for risk distorts incentives
because individuals
1' 87
no longer bear the full cost of their actions."
Not surprisingly, politics has again undermined optimal disaster
policy. As if to prove the political impossibility of achieving these
economic goals, the immediate effect of the Biggert-Waters Act's
provisions migrating NFIP premiums toward actuarially fair levels
was to spur congressional retreat. In late 2013 and early 2014, both
houses of Congress considered bills to retard the Biggert-Waters
reform's timetable for achieving actuarial soundness, with an
apparent eye toward eventual, outright repeal.188 As of July 2014, the
Senate has passed its version of a would-be Homeowner Flood
Insurance Affordability Act. Once again, popular expectations that
government will compensate victims for disaster-related losses drive
the "self-fulfilling prophecy" that "citizens ...will prefer not to
insure [catastrophic] risk." 189 "[S]olidarity" between empowered

185. See Priest, The Problem of CatastrophicLoss, supra note 17, at 224, 228.
See generally George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (describing the function of exclusions and other limitations
on coverage as that of reducing excessive ex ante incentives to consume insurance
services).
186. Kaplow, supra note 119, at 173. This observation applies not only to
disaster relief, but also to "a wide range of government programs [such as] ...
Medicare" and bank bailouts. Id.
187. Id. at 172.
188. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, H.R. 3370,
113th Cong. (2013); Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2013, S.
1846, 113th Cong. (2013).
189. Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk
Insurance, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 13, 25 (2005) (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Issues in Insurance, No. 8).
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disaster victims
and their political representatives "kills market
190
insurance."

C. Beyond FloodInsurance

Flood insurance and FEMA's administration of the NFIP illustrate
merely one facet of the grander problem. National governments are
often the only entities with sufficient size and power to serve as
reinsurers at large for the global insurance industry. From a global
perspective, only a few national governments have sufficient size and
stability to serve that function. For a shifting variety of economic
and political reasons, not all of those governments can or will provide
a financial backstop for the global insurance and reinsurance
industries.
Public subsidies for otherwise unprofitable lines of insurance
represent just one possibility within disaster law's portfolio of tools
for compensation and risk management. In the immediate aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, Congress entertained diverse proposals to
subsidize or reform private disaster insurance. 191 As with flood
insurance, Congress may elect to continue awarding federal
subsidies. Properly managed, these subsidies may motivate private
insurers and local governments to manage risks, particularly by
directing insured parties to avoid or even to leave high-risk areas.
Tax expenditures through exemptions, deductions, and credits 192 may
enable taxpayers to recover tax credits against insurance premiums or
to establish catastrophe savings accounts analogous to health savings
accounts, "529" college savings accounts, and individual retirement
accounts.1 93 Private insurers might receive preferential tax treatment
of contributions to financial reserves for catastrophic events. 9 Even
190. Id.
191. See DISASTER LAW & POLICY, supra note 1, at 343.
192. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1974).
On the regressive effect of tax
expenditures within a progressive tax structure, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 721-23 (1970); Jim Chen,
Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.

659, 662 (2012).
193. See H.R. 2100, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
194. See DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
Farber & Jim Chen eds., 2006).
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more ambitiously, the federal government might interject itself as the
ultimate reinsurer for catastrophic casualties and property loss. 195 In
so doing, government as reinsurer would use its financial might to
buttress an entire branch of the financial services industry, much as
federal deposit insurance restored confidence in banking during the
Great Depression.196 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act established a

program of this sort for insurance against terrorism. 197
As distasteful as public subsidization may seem, some alternatives
manage to combine greater political controversy with more
staggering potential for fiscal or even environmental damage. In the
absence of effective incentives to buy subsidized federal crop
insurance, 198 farmers and members of Congress representing the
country's most agrarian districts routinely demand and receive ad hoc
crop disaster relief. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980199
aimed to encourage farmers to participate in a program covering the
entire United States by subsidizing 30 percent of the premium needed
to indemnify 65 percent of the average farm's yield. 20 Despite
concerted efforts at reform, payments under the federal crop
195. See Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Financing CatastropheInsurance:A
New Proposal, in RISKING HOUSE AND HOME: DISASTERS, CITIES, PUBLIC POLICY

37, 40 (John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal eds., 2008).
196. See Martin H. Wolfson, The FinancialSystem and the Social Structure of
Accumulation, in SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF ACCUMULATION 133, 135 (David M.

Kotz, Terrence McDonough & Michael Reich eds., 1994).
197. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-297, § 1(a), 116
Stat. 2322 (2002) (amending scattered sections of 12 and 28 U.S.C.), as amended
by Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-144, § 1, 119
Stat. 2660 (2005) and Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of
2007, Pub. L. 110-160, § 1(a), 121 Stat. 1839 (2007). See generally Robert L.
Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, FinancialCompensationfor CatastrophicLoss in the
United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS AFTER CATASTROPHE

303 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2005); Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a
Post-9]]l Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435 (2007); Jeffrey Thomas, Insurance
Implications of September ]] and PossibleResponses, 34 URBAN LAW. 727 (2002).
198. See generally Steffen N. Johnson, Defining a JustifiedFederalRole in Crop
Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505 (1996).

199. See Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2012).
200. See BARRY K. GOODWIN & VINCENT H. SMITH, THE ECONOMICS OF CROP
INSURANCE AND DISASTER AID 46-47 (1995); Scott E. Fancher, How Safe Is the
Safety Net?: The Implications of Wiley v. Glickman, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 527,

531 (2002).
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insurance program have been excessive and contrary to the bedrock
insurance interest in avoiding moral hazard. 201 Worse still, because
agriculture makes a significant contribution to climate change, the
failure to reform crop insurance and other policies will promote
monoculture and aggravate farming's negative ecological
footprint. 202 One alternative to ad hoc agricultural assistance or
publicly subsidized crop insurance lies in index-based, parametrically
triggered futures contracts that might stabilize agricultural finance in
a way comparable to the impact of catastrophe bonds on financial
preparedness for natural disasters.2 °3
By the admittedly abysmal standard of crop insurance and
agricultural disaster assistance, government may find greater value in
establishing comprehensive compensation schemes in advance. The
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund 204 and the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
provide vivid if
controversial illustrations of this strategy. In these circumstances,
federal intervention accomplishes in legal terms what widespread
insurance typically seeks to do as a matter of financial practice:
neutralizing the ruinous and financially destabilizing prospect of tort
liability. The heightened risks posed by climate change put a
premium on efforts to reinforce private insurance through subsidies
and other forms of federal intervention. 206

201. See generally
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202. See, e.g., Mark Hertsgaard, Harvesting a Climate Disaster, N.Y. TIMES,
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PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 140 (2008).
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V. THE EFFICIENT FRONTIER OF DISASTER FINANCE

From conventional tort litigation to catastrophe bonds, this survey
demonstrates the conceptual unity of legal tools for compensating
victims and spreading risk, whether through insurance, securitization,
or public disaster assistance. Just as there is no such thing as a
strictly natural disaster, there is no such thing as strictly private
disaster law. The very existence of calamities beyond the capacity of
ordinary citizens, companies, and institutions demands public
intervention at every level. Far from being deviations from the
presumed tasks of private law - the enforcement of primary rights
and duties binding private citizens to each other 201 - taxation,
subsidization, regulation, and public investment are tools of first
resort in disaster law. 20 8 These tools, intrusive and interventionist by
design, are the leading components of the20 portfolio
of rules at the
9
efficient frontier of disaster law and policy.
The catastrophe bond specifically shows that disaster law's
interplay of private actors and public governance operates in both
directions. Conventional portrayals of risk management techniques
in disaster law begin and end with public contributions to systems of
compensation and insurance that the private sector cannot adequately
manage on its own. 21 Whatever their delivery vehicle, subsidies add
211
public dollars to private insurance markets.
Official involvement
in catastrophic risk management inexorably thrusts government into
207. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 130
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (defining a primary duty
as "an authoritatively recognized obligation ... not to do something, or to do it, or
to do it if at all only in a prescribed way"); cf Ann Woolhander & Michael G.
Collis, FederalQuestion Jurisdictionand Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2151, 2154-55 (2009) (distinguishing between "primary dut[ies]" running between
individuals - for instance "not to cause injury to the property" of each other and "remedial dut[ies] ... to provide a remedy to the person whose primary rights
were violated") (citing Hart & Sacks, supra, at 137).
208. See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 195, at 37-39.
209. See id. at 37; cf Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy:
Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1315, 1359-60
(1995) (describing a wide range of laws as variations on the theme of public
finance).

210. See, e.g., Louis Cruz, Examining Current Proposalsfor Increasing the
FederalRole in Dealingwith CoastalHurricaneRisk, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 323, 329-

31 (2009).
211. Seeid. at 351.
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the role of the ultimate reinsurer for all risks to property, life, and
health. Catastrophe bonds illustrate the opposite effect. In all of its
manifestations, alternative risk transfer promises the tantalizing
possibility that private capital markets can infuse money from
voluntary, profit-seeking participants into the project of managing
catastrophic risk.2 12
The practical exercise of evaluating tools for compensating disaster
victims and spreading risk does more than apply disaster theory to
existing legal tools and doctrines. This survey of risk management
techniques in disaster law - from private insurance to public
subsidies, with a tantalizing promise that private capital markets may
yet enhance catastrophic preparedness - depicts disaster law as a
comprehensive, theoretically coherent exercise in societal risk
management.
The elusive pursuit of a fully diversified and
theoretically coherent portfolio of financial tools for managing
catastrophic risk shows how far disaster policy must still travel in
order to reach the efficient frontier of legal preparedness for
calamity.

212. See Bruggeman, supra note 67, at 10,140-4 1.

